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Introduction
The attention being given to the consequences of climate 
change, and environmental issues in general, has in-
creased considerably in recent decades. This is particularly 
true of climate experts and policy-makers, but companies 
and households have also changed their behaviour in 
order to combat climate change. This issue has been the 
subject of numerous reports by esteemed researchers in 
a variety of fi  elds (physicians, chemists, climate scientists, 
economists, sociologists, etc.). This article aims to depict 
the principle facets of this issue, focusing on the situation 
in Belgium as much as possible.
The fi  rst part of the article briefl  y presents the possible 
causes of climate change and their effects. The second 
part describes several aspects of climate policy in an inter-
national context, paying close attention to policy targets 
and instruments. The third part examines some key stud-
ies that quantify the impact of the fi  ght against climate 
change on the Belgian economy. We identify the areas in 
which there is the greatest room for improvement, taking 
into account the structural characteristics of the Belgian 
economy. We formulate several conclusions in the fourth 
section, the most signifi  cant of which is that the fi  ght 
against climate change not only has a cost, it also offers 
opportunities.
1.  Climate change
Global warming has received most of the attention in 
recent decades. The average global temperature has pro-
gressively increased over the past 35 years, such that the 
temperature in 2010 was about 0.8 °C higher than the 
average for the period 1951-1980. It is vital to understand 
the causes of this warming and its consequences in order 
to set an optimal climate policy. However, we still face a 
number of uncertainties.
The causes of global warming are still being debated, 
even though most scientists believe that the warming is 
very likely caused, to a material extent, by human activity. 
For example, the growing use of fossil fuels (coal, crude 
oil and natural gas), deforestation and agriculture are 
increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, amplifying the natural greenhouse effect, 
which is thought to be raising global temperatures. That 
being the case, several attempts have been made in re-
cent decades to reduce world greenhouse gas emissions 
and thereby reverse an exponential trend.
The consequences of warming are shrouded in even 
greater uncertainty. There is (as of yet) no consensus as 
to how high temperatures will rise and what the impact 
will be on mankind and the environment. However, it is 
widely thought that coastal regions will lose land to the 
sea due to rising ocean levels. As warming speeds up, we 
are also likely to see a decrease in biodiversity, because 
certain animal and plant species will be unable to adapt 
quickly enough. One of the consequences that already 
appears to be happening is an increased frequency of ex-
treme weather conditions. The resulting natural disasters 
are having a signifi  cant impact on agricultural production, 60
(1)  A 37 cm rise in sea level corresponds to the IPCC’s A2 scenario, which assumes 
a very heterogeneous world characterised by high population growth, slow 
economic development, and slow technological change.
the availability of drinking water, and public health. Not 
only do these disasters result in a loss of human life, they 
also destroy a portion of the production capacity and 
infrastructure of affected economies, undermining their 
growth potential. Because the direct consequences of 
global warming vary greatly from one region to the next, 
inequalities are likely to widen, which could result in large-
scale migration.
Quantifying the impact of climate change is made even 
harder by the fact that the process is necessarily based on 
a number of technical assumptions. It is, thus, difficult to 
express some of the expected impacts in monetary terms. 
The loss of human life, the loss of biodiversity, migratory 
flows, and so on can be expressed in thousands of units, 
but must be translated into monetary terms. Furthermore, 
consequences vary greatly from one region to the next, so 
the aggregation method will influence the final outcome. 
Lastly, certain effects will be felt quickly, whereas others 
will only show up later on. The choice of the discount rate 
will thus influence the final result. The available total cost 
estimates for climate change are thus very diverse. Two 
estimates often cited are those of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Stern Review 
(2007). In 2007, the IPCC announced that if no action 
were taken to combat climate change, world GDP would 
eventually be 1 % to 5 % lower. By contrast, Stern claimed 
that, in a more comprehensive scenario, the total costs 
could reach 5 % to 14 % of world GDP per capita.
For Belgium, as for the rest of Western Europe, the con-
sequences of climate change appear less dramatic at first 
glance than for certain other regions. A limited rise in the 
average temperature is even likely to benefit agriculture 
and the tourism sector. However, further out, more ex-
treme weather conditions and rising sea levels will have 
negative consequences, especially for the Belgian coast. 
According to a recent study conducted in 2009 by rein-
surer Swiss Re working with the University of Berne, the 
damage to the Belgian coast as a result of more violent 
storms and an expected 37cm rise in sea level by the end 
of the century will be three times greater than present 
damage  (1). Measures will have to be taken to better 
protect coastal regions. One possibility is to make dykes 
better able to resist superstorms. Other projects aim to 
raise several sandbanks using sand from maintenance 
dredging of waterways to prevent waves from breaking 
on the shore. But more violent storms and abundant 
rainfall could have serious consequences for the rest of 
Belgium as well, not just for farming and the insurance 
sector, but also for companies working in other sectors 
of the economy, and for households, whose buildings 
and machinery could be damaged. This is why authorities 
need to adapt land planning and construction regulations. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning a certain number of impacts 
on public health (van Ypersele and Marbaix, 2004). For 
example, more frequent or intense heatwaves are result-
ing in more heat-related deaths in the over-65 population. 
Conversely, fewer very cold winter days tend to reduce 
the number of cardiovascular deaths.
Even though the direct effects of climate change will 
undoubtedly remain limited in Belgium, our country must 
join the global fight against climate change, not just out 
of solidarity with the developing countries that will be hit 
the hardest, despite the fact that they are not the source 
of much of the problem, but also because the effort could 
generate positive effects through lower energy consump-
tion. Belgian companies will suffer a loss of competitive-
ness if they lower their energy costs less sharply than their 
principal competitors on international markets, which 
would be extremely detrimental for an open economy. 
Furthermore, using less crude oil and natural gas for en-
ergy purposes will free up resources for numerous other 
basic applications, such as plastics and fertilisers, which 
is notably in the interest of future generations. More 
judicious use of these natural resources is not only neces-
sary because of global warming, but also from an ethical 
standpoint.
This article focuses principally on efforts to fight climate 
change by limiting greenhouse gas concentration in the 
atmosphere. However, even if greenhouse gas emissions 
were completely halted, global warming would continue 
due to the delayed effects of earlier emissions. At this 
point, it is important to take steps simultaneously to 
mitigate the unavoidable harmful consequences on the 
population, the economy and the environment. Because 
the effects of climate change vary greatly from one region 
to the next, the necessary mitigation efforts will also vary. 
Even so, there are several general measures worth men-
tioning, such as investing in water reservoirs, choosing 
plants suitable for farming, strengthening dykes, creating 
controlled flood areas, devising or altering emergency 
plans, etc.
2.  Climate policy
The numerous uncertainties surrounding the causes and 
consequences of climate change are the reason why the 
international community has not reacted earlier and more 
radically to this ecological shock. Nevertheless, it has 
gradually become apparent that the impact may be ex-
tremely negative for many countries, and even irreversible 61
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in certain cases. Given the global nature of the ecological 
shock, the fight can only be waged through international 
agreements aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
with the overall goal then translated into national plans.
2.1  International climate agreements
2.1.1  Emissions reduction targets
For international climate agreements to be reached, the 
mostly likely causes and consequences of climate change 
had to be clearly delineated. To this end, the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) created an in-
ternational network of scientists, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 1988. This group 
of experts was tasked with conducting a critical and 
objective analysis of the scientific, technical and socio-
economic literature on climate change. The IPCC’s mission 
was to inventory and evaluate the current state of climate 
change science, without carrying out its own research. Its 
work was to result in summary assessment reports upon 
which policy-makers could base their decisions. So far, the 
IPCC has released four assessment reports, in 1990, 1995, 
2001 and 2007. A fifth report is scheduled for release 
in 2014. The IPCC has also published several supporting 
documents, such as special reports on particular issues 
and methodological reports.
The IPCC’s first assessment report, published in 1990, was 
the basis of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in 1992 in Rio de 
Janeiro. The Convention sought to fight climate change 
caused by the greenhouse effect that is amplified by 
human activity. To do so, it was decided to stabilise con-
centrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent any dangerous disturbance to 
the climate system. Most of all, the Convention offered 
a general framework requiring industrialised countries 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2000, without specifying concretely how they should 
do so.
It was only after years of negotiations that the Parties 
to the UNFCCC reached an agreement in Kyoto in 1997 
containing concrete targets for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol calls for signatory indus-
trialised nations to reduce their average greenhouse gas 
emissions during the period 2008-2012 by at least 5  % 
overall relative to 1990 levels. The exact percentage re-
ductions vary from one country to the next, as a function 
of economic potential, emissions levels and the goodwill 
of the countries in question. For example, the US was 
supposed to cut its emissions by 7  %, Japan by 6  % and 
the EU-15 by 8  %. However, the US never ratified the 
Protocol. For the other countries, the reduction targets 
are binding. If they do not reach their targets, they will 
be forced to make up the difference during the following 
commitment period (after 2012), with a surcharge set 
at 30  %. The Kyoto Protocol does not include emissions 
reduction targets for emerging countries such as China 
or India.
No binding agreement has been reached at the global 
level for the period after 2012. In January 2010, the 
industrialised nations and several developing countries 
– which together are responsible for more than 80  % of 
world greenhouse gas emissions – set concrete targets 
in the Copenhagen Accord that they hope to reach by 
2020. However, these pledges are not legally binding. 
Furthermore, an analysis of these national targets shows 
that the joint effort to which these countries have com-
mitted will not be enough to keep global warming below 
the threshold of 2 °C above pre-industrial temperatures.
Despite the lack of an international agreement at the 
world level, the European Union’s 2009 climate and en-
ergy package set a number of ambitious targets that it 
hopes to meet by 2020. For example, it plans to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by at least 20 % rela-
tive to 1990 levels. If other developed countries make a 
similar commitment, the EU will raise that reduction tar-
get to 30 %. Furthermore, the percentage of final energy 62
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(1)  Average emissions over the period 2008-2009.
consumption derived from renewable sources must be 
raised to 20 %, and at least 10 % of energy for transport 
must be produced sustainably. Lastly, it aims to increase 
energy efficiency by 20 %, but this target is not binding.
2.1.2  Evaluating ongoing efforts
The Parties to the Convention on Climate Change must 
report annually on greenhouse gas emission volumes. The 
figures available up to 2009 inclusive show that results 
vary considerably among the largest countries. On the 
one hand are countries like the Russian Federation and 
Australia, whose average greenhouse gas emissions in 
2008-2009 were significantly below the authorised level. 
These developments are partly attributable to changes in 
the economic structure of those countries, as the most 
polluting economic activities have grown less significant. 
Furthermore, modernisation of the industrial tool – in 
response to both environmental considerations and rising 
energy prices – has also played a role. Lastly, the reduc-
tion in emissions in 2009 is partly attributable to weaker 
demand for energy because of the recession. On the other 
hand are large countries like the US, Japan and Canada, 
whose average greenhouse gas emissions in 2008-2009 
were well above the authorised level and who will have 
to step up their efforts considerably.
This observation is equally true of some emerging econo-
mies – which are, however, not party to the Kyoto 
Protocol. These countries have enjoyed robust economic 
growth, but have also risen quickly through the rank-
ings of greenhouse gas emitters. According to the most 
recent figures from the World Resources Institute for 
2005, greenhouse gas emissions have risen by respectively 
101.3  % and 68.1  % in China and India since 1990. In 
2005, these countries were respectively the biggest and 
fifth-biggest polluters in the world. At the same time, 
their per capita emissions remain very low compared with 
countries like Australia, the US and Canada, whose per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions are around 4.5 times 
higher, and compared with Belgium, whose per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions are around 2.5 times higher. 
While it is essential, in the post-Kyoto period, for more 
countries to commit to reducing their greenhouse gas 
emissions, in setting concrete targets it is necessary 
to take into account the “lag” exhibited by emerging 
countries.
The EU-15 countries are somewhere in the middle  : 
average greenhouse gas emissions during the period 
2008-2009 were 9.5 % below the base year, whereas the 
reduction target for the period 2008-2012 was only 8 %. 
However, it is important to remember that the reduction 
in emissions in 2009 was partly attributable to weaker 
demand for energy caused by the recession. In 2010, 
this decrease probably experienced a correction, and may 
have even been temporarily reversed. The EU-15 never-
theless appears to be on track to meet its target for the 
period 2008-2012.
However, it is worth pointing out that the Member States 
are not all producing the same results with respect to lim-
iting greenhouse gas emissions. When the Kyoto Protocol 
was concluded, very different targets were set. For exam-
ple, certain countries pledged to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions (Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Austria, 
the UK, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands), whereas oth-
er Member States sought only to stabilise their emissions 
(France and Finland), and still others decided to cap the 
increase in their emissions (Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal). Given the range of targets, it makes more 63
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sense to evaluate ongoing efforts by using the difference 
between average emissions during the period 2008-2009 
and the countries’ individual Kyoto targets. Based on this 
yardstick, Sweden and the UK have clearly had the best 
results. Both countries managed to lower their green-
house gas emissions during the period 2008-2009 to a 
level more than 10  % below their Kyoto targets. France 
and Greece are also ahead of target by around 6  %. 
Conversely, Luxembourg and Austria were the weakest  : 
their average emissions over the period 2008-2009 were 
more than 20  % higher than their Kyoto targets. Spain 
and Denmark also must intensify their efforts, given that 
their emissions were on average more than 10  % higher 
than their Kyoto targets.
With a 10.9  % reduction, Belgium’s performance during 
the period 2008-09 was better than the targeted 7.5  %. 
While the result is partially attributable to the abrupt 
economic slump, which reduced energy consumption 
during the 2009 crisis, Belgium could easily meet its Kyoto 
target by 2012 without additional measures. According 
to the Federal Planning Bureau’s economic outlook for   
2011-2016, greenhouse gas emissions during the period 
2008-2012 are expected to be 11  % lower on average 
than the 1990 level. Additional measures will, however, 
be necessary to meet the 2020 targets in the European 
climate and energy package. According to the Federal 
Planning Bureau, the biggest need for reducing emissions 
lies with energy-intensive industrial facilities, and signifi-
cant efforts still need to be made in terms of renewable 
energy.
2.2  Climate policy instruments
In Belgium, jurisdiction over climate policy – covering 
the environmental, energy and transport fields – is cur-
rently split between the federal government and the three 
Regions. The fragmentation makes it more complicated 
to implement a national strategy to fight climate change, 
even though several coordinating bodies have been creat-
ed to encourage dialogue and collaboration, ensure con-
sistent policies and unlock needed synergies. For example, 
the National Climate Commission in 2009 developed the 
first National Climate Plan, which synthesises all of the 
measures taken by the various levels of government to 
meet the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol. This plan also 
lays the groundwork for a post-2012 strategy. It sets goals 
for six key sectors – optimise energy production, use en-
ergy rationally in buildings, work on industrial processes, 
develop sustainable modes of transport, encourage the 
sustainable management of agricultural and forest eco-
systems, and step up waste management efforts – many 
of which are examined in greater detail in section three 
of this article.
Above all, a climate policy aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions must get economic agents (both produc-
ers and consumers) to modify their behaviour. To reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption will have 
to fall through increased energy efficiency, and the energy 
mix will have to change to include a lower percentage of 
carbon, which means reducing the use of coal and, to a 
lesser extent, crude oil in favour of nuclear energy, natu-
ral gas and  /or renewable sources. In concrete terms, this 
means notably that companies will have to adapt their 
production processes and introduce new technologies, 
and that households will have to pay more attention to 
the sustainability of their purchases when making con-
sumption and investment decisions.
There are several ways to encourage the needed behav-
ioural changes. The various instruments can be split into 
two main categories : market instruments, which influence 
the relative prices of products (such as tradable emissions 
permits, environmental taxes and green subsidies), and 
non-market instruments. Among the second group, the 
principal instruments are regulatory, such as prohibitions 
or standards for certain goods and services. This group of 
instruments also includes measures aimed at promoting 
research into new technologies, and subsequently their 
development and spread, as well as measures aimed at 
informing and raising awareness among the population 
and companies.
In general, climate policy consists in calibrating these in-
struments, taking into account numerous factors, particu-
larly the manner in which greenhouse gases are emitted. If 
emissions are principally caused by economic sectors that 
are highly sensitive to price movements, the instruments 
that influence relative prices will be a good choice. Where 
this is not the case – notably in the transport sector – 
other instruments will have to be used, such as promoting 
innovation or improving public transport options. Social 
aspects must also be kept in mind. For example, most 
environmental taxes are regressive, as costs weigh propor-
tionally more heavily on lower-income classes. However, 
they also generate receipts for public authorities that can 
be used, among other things, to lower the tax burden on 
labour (or certain categories of labour), support innova-
tion or reduce the public debt. Lastly, environmental policy 
must not imperil the competitiveness of companies active 
on international markets. In this respect, it is important for 
environmental goals to be subscribed to by a very large 
number of countries, and that carbon leakage be avoided 
as much as possible. This occurs when companies decide 
to relocate some or all of their polluting production to 64











countries with more lenient climate rules. According to a 
2010 OECD estimate, carbon leakage would amount to 
around 12 % if the EU unilaterally imposed a 50 % reduc-
tion in emissions by 2050, whereas the number would be 
less than 2  % if all industrialised countries made similar 
commitments.
2.2.1  Market instruments that influence price
Market instruments that influence the relative prices of 
products are designed to internalise negative externalities. 
The private cost of producing or consuming a product 
is lower than the social cost, because the latter also in-
cludes external effects such as greenhouse gas emissions. 
The market price of the product (Pp ) – obtained where de-
mand meets the marginal private cost – does not take into 
account these externalities and will thus be lower than the 
optimal price from a societal standpoint (Ps), which results 
in excessive use of the product (Qp > Qs ).
In the case of an emissions permit trading system, au-
thorities issue a number of emissions permits for a certain 
period, which can then be traded. The limited overall 
quantity creates scarcity, which then, through market 
mechanisms, causes the price of emissions permits to 
rise. This encourages companies to reduce their emis-
sions. The advantage of such a system is that the target 
for reducing emissions is set by the authorities. However, 
the carbon value varies over time, so companies have no 
certainty as to the additional costs engendered by emit-
ting greenhouse gases. This uncertainty may diminish 
their willingness to invest in the development and use of 
new technologies. Furthermore, companies in this type of 
system have less incentive to reduce their emissions once 
the target is reached.
The market for tradable emissions permits must be deep 
enough and liquid enough for prices to correctly reflect 
the carbon value. Because such a market could not be 
created by most European countries acting individually, 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched 
in 2005. At present, some 11 000 energy-intensive in-
stallations compulsorily participate in the system. They 
consist chiefly of power plants, combustion plants, oil 
refineries, cokers, iron and steel works and plants produc-
ing cement, glass, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper. These 
installations together generate around 40  % of the EU’s 
greenhouse gas emissions.
In phase one (from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007), 
it was up to the Member States to determine the total 
quantity of emissions permits for their country and how 
to allocate them (mostly free of charge) among the indi-
vidual installations by crafting a national allocation plan 
that had to be approved by the EC. Companies were re-
quired, after the year had ended, to turn in the emissions 
permits owed. If a company’s emissions exceeded the 
number of permits it owned, it would have to pay a fine 
of € 40 for each missing emissions permit and turn in the 
owed emissions permits the following year. During phase 
two (from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012), the 
system is largely the same, but the number of emissions 
permits has been reduced and the fine for each missing 
permit raised to € 100. Furthermore, emissions rights can 
be carried over from one year to the next, which was not 
the case in phase one.
For phase three (from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 
2020), the rules will be changed considerably. First of 
all, the number of emissions permits for the entire EU 
will be limited. It will be lowered each year by 1.74  %  ; 
the total number of emissions permits in 2020 will 
thus be 21  % lower than the amount issued in 2005. 
Second, a growing share of the emissions permits will 
be auctioned. However, activities that consume a great 
deal of energy and would thus experience a significant 
competitive disadvantage – implying the risk of carbon 
leakage – will still be initially allocated most of the emis-
sions permits free of charge. The auction proceeds could 
reach, according to EC estimates, between € 30 billion 
and €  50 billion annually by 2020, depending on the 
permit price. Member States have agreed that at least 
half of this revenue will be used to fight climate change, 
both in Europe and in developing countries. Third, the air 
transport sector, international shipping, and the capture, 
transport and storage of CO2 will be incorporated into 65
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the trading system. By contrast, small installations are to 
be excluded to keep administrative costs down, provided 
that the appropriate Member State applies equivalent 
environmental levies to those installations. Lastly, the 
fine per permit not received will be adjusted to euro area 
inflation annually.
The extent to which companies are prepared to make 
efforts to limit their greenhouse gas emissions depends 
principally on prevailing market prices. These need to be 
not only sufficiently high, but also relatively stable. To 
increase its energy efficiency, a company must make size-
able investments over a fairly long period. As uncertainties 
regarding the future carbon value increase, a company 
will be less temped to make the necessary investments 
and so will adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Until now, 
emissions permit prices have been very volatile. In the first 
year of the EU ETS’s operations, this volatility may have 
been attributable to a lack of market liquidity, because 
too many emissions permits were granted. Prices then 
fell sharply when the figures on actual emissions were 
released in late April 2006. In following years, price trends 
were less volatile, although significant fluctuations contin-
ued. For example, the price of a futures contract matur-
ing in December 2010 traded on the European Climate 
Exchange rose from a low of €  13.3 on 20 February 
2007 to a peak of € 31.7 on 1 July 2008, or an increase 
of 138.4  %. Demand for emissions permits rose sharply 
over the period, with more coal being used to generate 
Chart 4  emissions Permit Prices
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electricity in response to a rising oil price, resulting in high-
er CO2 emissions. The carbon value then plunged follow-
ing the economic and financial crisis, reaching a new low 
of € 8.4 on 12 February 2009. Subsequently, the market 
recovered somewhat and the price of a futures contract 
maturing in December 2010 fluctuated between € 12.5 
and € 16.5. Longer contracts are a bit more expensive, 
but their prices exhibited comparable trends.
The EU ETS is the pre-eminent way to reduce emissions 
by industry and public utilities. However, Member States 
must also take steps to limit the greenhouse gas emissions 
of sectors not subject to the ETS (such as households, the 
transport sector and agriculture). One way of doing so is 
to levy environmental taxes. Unlike the emissions permit 
trading system, imposing an environmental tax offers no 
guarantees with respect to emissions reduction. The final 
outcome depends on the behaviour of producers and 
consumers. Environmental taxes also pose the disadvan-
tage of offering less ability to differentiate between pro-
duction and consumption locations and methods. On the 
other hand, a sufficiently high tax rate gives companies 
a permanent catalyst to develop and use new technolo-
gies. Once a new technology is adopted on a large scale, 
emissions reductions can thus be more pronounced than 
authorities’ initial estimates.
For the EU, environmental tax receipts averaged 2.6  % 
of GDP over the period 1995-2009, but there were sig-
nificant disparities among the countries. Belgian receipts 
were limited to 2.3  % of GDP on average, the second-
lowest figure in the EU-15. Of its three principal neigh-
bours, France and Germany also make little use of envi-
ronmental taxes. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
environmental tax receipts have hovered around 3.8 % of 
GDP. Denmark is by far the leading country in this respect, 
with receipts averaging 5.3  % of GDP. The positioning of 
Denmark and the Netherlands is remarkable not only in 
terms of the average tax receipts over the period in ques-
tion, but also in terms of their trends. Whereas EU envi-
ronmental tax receipts have fallen by 0.4  % of GDP since 
1999, they have been relatively stable in the Netherlands 
and even rose in Denmark until 2006, after which they 
fell sharply. But the development in environmental taxes is 
influenced by two factors : on the one hand, environmen-
tal tax rates, and on the other, consumption of the taxed 
good. A downward trend does not necessarily indicate 
that authorities have eliminated environmental taxes  ; it 
may also be attributable to the fact that taxes are effective 
in reducing consumption of polluting products.  
From a statistical standpoint, environmental taxes are 
generally split into three categories. The biggest group 
is taxes on energy. This category includes taxes on fuel 66
Chart 5  environmental tax receiPts






















































Source  : EC.
used in transport, heating oil, natural gas, coal and elec-
tricity, along with CO2 taxes. Between 1996 and 2009, 
these taxes trended downward in Belgium, as in the 
EU. However, this trend was temporarily interrupted in   
2003-2005, when several structural measures were en-
acted to tie automobile transport costs to the use of 
the vehicle rather than its possession. During the period 
2006-2008, however, energy taxes were again lowered 
in Belgium, principally due to application of the reverse 
ratchet system to petrol and diesel. Belgian energy tax 
policy has often proceeded by trial and error, and has in 
some cases lacked a long-term vision.
Apart from energy taxes, taxes on transport play a rela-
tively important role. They include both the one-off tax 
paid when a vehicle is purchased and recurring charges, 
but not excise duties on petrol or diesel, which fall under 
energy taxes. The relative significance of transport taxes 
does not show a clear trend in any of the countries stud-
ied, although it has fluctuated significantly over time in 
the Netherlands and especially Denmark. Lastly, taxes on 
pollution and resources bring in much less. They include 
notably taxes on packaging, atmospheric pollution, waste 
and water use. However, it is this category that is the 
reason for the upward trend in environmental taxes as a 
percentage of GDP in Denmark.
To cover all the bases, it is worth adding that in addition 
to tradable emissions permits and environmental taxes, 
the category of instruments that influence the relative 
prices of products also includes environmental subsidies 
and tax deductions for green products. Such is the case 
with green certificates and cogeneration certificates, 
which stipulate a minimum guaranteed price, designed 
to encourage the production of green electricity and the 
cogeneration of heat and electricity. Furthermore, tax cuts 
for various energy-saving investments have been enacted 
for personal income taxes in Belgium. These investments 
include replacing old boilers, installing double-pane win-
dows, and improving home insulation. Tax advantages are 
also granted for the purchase of environmentally friendly 
vehicles. Companies can also take advantage of tax incen-
tives when they make certain energy-saving investments.
2.2.2  Non-market instruments
Correcting the price signal to include the external ef-
fects of greenhouse gas emissions will not, however, be 
enough to sufficiently lower these emissions. That is why 
non-market instruments must also be used. Regulatory 
instruments are the principal tools in this category. 
Authorities may decide, for example, to completely out-
law the use of certain pollutants, such as was the case 
with chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Their use was progres-
sively banned by the Montreal Protocol. Incandescent 
light bulbs, as well, will gradually disappear from the 
EU between 2009 and 2012. Furthermore, authorities 
may impose standards for certain products. Ordinarily, 
this practice is also used at the EU level to avoid unfair 
competition. For example, Directives dealing with the 
ecodesign of energy-using products and energy-related 
products have established a framework for setting re-
quirements designed to optimise the environmental per-
formance of products throughout their life cycle without 
impairing their functional characteristics. Among the 
energy-using products targeted are, notably, domestic 
appliances, consumer electronics, lighting, office equip-
ment, heating, air conditioning and ventilation systems, 
electric motor systems, pumps, fans, transformers and 
industrial ovens. The group of energy-related products 
includes, notably, windows, insulation materials and 
water-consuming products, such as shower heads and 
water taps. Lastly, there are also overall standards in 
terms of energy performance and insulation for new 
housing, which are intended to improve the energy ef-
ficiency of the housing stock (see below, section 3.2.2).
Given the extent of the actions needed, companies, house-
holds and authorities will also have to take part in the 
general trend toward significantly improved technologies 
or new technologies, especially for activities that generate 
the most pollution. The nature of the new technologies 
that will be needed to considerably reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions over the long term is such that the private 67
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sector will not be able to act on its own. What is needed 
is not marginal improvements to existing technologies, but 
rather a technological revolution that will substantially cut 
energy consumption without affecting economic growth 
and prosperity. Without sufficient support from authori-
ties, private companies will be slower to want to develop 
such technologies. As a result, it would be technically im-
possible to meet ambitious environmental targets.
To begin with, these new technologies will not be profit-
able unless they can be used on a large scale. During the 
first phase of the innovation process (invention), costs 
are high and the likelihood of commercial success is low. 
Given this risk profile, it is often difficult for companies 
to find enough affordable financing from banks or on 
financial markets. As effective new technologies become 
more widely used, their costs decline during the market-
ing phase due to the learning curve and economies of 
scale. It is thus up to authorities to support research into 
new technologies, chiefly during the initial phase. In ad-
dition, authorities can pay an incentive to users of the 
new technology during this initial phase in order to reach 
critical mass more quickly.
Secondly, innovation can be viewed as a public good, in 
the sense that once the new technology has been devel-
oped, the knowledge is shared with other companies. 
Other companies can thus build on that knowledge, 
which increases the likelihood that the innovation will 
be effective. However, the drawback of this situation is 
that the economic benefits of the investment in new 
technologies do not all accrue to the (first) innovating 
company. Thus, the company is not assured of being 
able to profit sufficiently from its investment down the 
road, which may dissuade it from taking such big risks. 
This is yet another argument for authorities to provide 
financial assistance to companies trying to develop new 
technologies.
For companies that emit a great deal of CO2, R&D and in-
novation are naturally important. As long as they manage 
to reduce their emissions at a price lower than the carbon 
value, they will be getting a good deal. But for other com-
panies as well, eco-innovation can be a powerful catalyst. 
Given that climate change is a global problem, the world 
market for eco-innovations is very large. The idea is to 
seize such opportunities as quickly as possible and to be 
among the first movers in this vast market.
Innovation in general and eco-innovation in particular 
now occupy a central place in the EC’s Europe 2020 strat-
egy and in the OECD’s green growth strategy. In Belgium 
as well, innovation plays a major role in Wallonia’s 
Marshall Plans and in Vlaanderen in Actie’s Pact 2020. 
Organisational and financial support will be available for 
cooperation agreements between companies, research 
centres and training centres and it will be easier to estab-
lish innovative new companies.
Lastly, authorities can also do a lot to help raise the aware-
ness of companies and households on climate change 
issues. Targeted information campaigns can show how 
far we have to go in certain areas and present the actions 
that can or must be taken, along with what forms of 
public assistance are available.
3.  Impact of the fight against climate 
change on the Belgian economy
The economic impact of the fight against climate change 
can be analysed using several approaches. The first 
consists in using an econometric model to simulate the 
macroeconomic consequences of the targets imposed by 
the European climate and energy package. Section 3.1 
presents the results of two of these studies. We can also 
take a more descriptive approach focused on the methods 
used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Using this ap-
proach, we will look successively at the decrease in energy 
intensity of certain activities (section 3.2), the increasing 
use of renewable energy (3.3) and, as a last resort, CO2 
capture and storage (3.4).
3.1  Macroeconomic impact of the European 
climate and energy package
Estimating the impact of the fight against climate change 
on the Belgian economy requires to formulate a number 
of hypotheses. For example, it is important first of all to 
create a baseline scenario describing the likely trend in 
energy consumption assuming no change in (climate) 
policy. To this end, it is necessary to formulate working 
assumptions regarding population trends, the number 
of households, economic growth and commodity prices. 
One must then develop several scenarios under which it is 
possible to meet the targets of the European climate and 
energy package. The results of these simulations can then 
be compared against those of the baseline scenario to 
determine the impact of the fight against climate change.
3.1.1  Impact on energy consumption
The Bank does not have a model that allows us to quantify 
the impact on the Belgian economy of the fight against 
climate change. The Federal Planning Bureau, however, 
has already conducted several simulations in this respect. 
According to Bossier et al. (2008), the targets of the 68
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Source  : GEMIX Group (2009).
European climate and energy package will have a twofold 
impact on Belgian energy consumption. First of all, the 
introduction of carbon pricing is expected to push up en-
ergy prices and thereby reduce final energy consumption 
by a total of 5.7  % in 2020 compared with the baseline 
scenario. Secondly, the energy mix is expected to shift in 
favour of a lower carbon content. In this case, the carbon 
value will influence the relative prices of the various energy 
sources, and the explicit target for renewable energies will 
also play a role. The principal energy sources that will be 
significantly lower than in the baseline scenario are oil de-
mand for heating and transport, and non-renewable elec-
tricity consumption, by respectively 10.6  % and 11.5  %. 
Natural gas consumption for heating and industrial pro-
cesses would also be more limited, but the 5.5  % drop 
relative to the baseline scenario is less pronounced. This is 
attributable notably to the fact that industry has already 
substantially improved its energy efficiency and significant 
additional economies will only be possible by extensively 
adapting industrial processes, which is not possible with 
current technology. Compared with the baseline scenario, 
renewable energy consumption would be around 50  % 
higher, but would still only represent 11.6  % of total final 
energy consumption in 2020.
In its 30 September 2009 report, the GEMIX Group ar-
gued that it would be possible to lower final energy con-
sumption by 14.5 % relative to the baseline scenario. The 
additional decrease is principally due to the oil demand 
for heating and transport and the natural gas demand for 
heating and industrial processes. To meet these targets, it 
is advisable to pursue a particularly aggressive policy with 
respect to energy efficiency, emphasising building insula-
tion, improving public transport, increasing multimodal 
transport, and clean vehicles (see below, section 3.2).
As already pointed out in section 2.1.2, energy consump-
tion fell significantly in 2009 due to the economic crisis, 
which invalidated the baseline scenario presented above. 
The updated version of Bossier et al. (2011) accounts for 
the impact of the crisis, and assumes stronger popula-
tion growth and higher energy prices. The study also 
takes into consideration certain energy-saving measures 
enacted in 2008 and 2009. While the principal results of 
Bossier et al. (2008) are confirmed, the needed energy 
savings represent only 1  % in the new study, compared 
with 6  % in the previous version. It is principally natural 
gas consumption and, to a lesser extent, oil consumption 
that will need to be reduced still further. The results of the 
two studies are comparable with respect to renewable 
energy sources.
3.1.2  Impact on economic activity and employment
The macroeconomic impact of the fight against climate 
change has a number of aspects, including direct costs 
linked to the actions taken at the national level to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, which include investment in 
renewable energies and energy-efficient technologies, 
higher energy prices and the costs of adapting to chang-
ing energy consumption, as well as the direct costs of 
using the flexibility mechanisms that allow to meet targets 
for emissions reductions and renewable energies abroad. 
According to the estimates of Bossier et al. (2008), the 
total direct costs for Belgium will amount to 0.86  % of 
GDP in 2020  (1). The macroeconomic consequences for the 
Belgian economy, however, also include feedback effects. 
Whereas new technology investments represent a cost 
for the companies that make them, they will also gener-
ate revenues for the companies that make the purchased 
products. In addition, authorities will have additional re-
sources (from environmental taxes and emissions permit 
auctions) that they can inject into the economy. The total 
(1)  According to the updated version of Bossier et al. (2011), the total direct costs 
would represent only 0.3 % of GDP. This study, however, does not include the 
new estimate of the macroeconomic impact of the European climate and energy 
package, at least with respect to the scenario considered here for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions by 20 % by 2020, and for that reason it is not 
considered in this section.69
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impact of the fight against climate change will conse-
quently be smaller.
Bossier et al. (2008) calculated that in 2020, GDP would 
be “only” 0.45  % lower than in the baseline scenario, 
even if authorities choose not to use the additional pro-
ceeds to stimulate the economy. The rise in energy prices 
will hurt individuals’ purchasing power, thus slowing con-
sumption. Business investment will fall more sharply due 
to the drop in production. Whereas exports will also be 
slightly lower, this decline will be offset by a considerably 
drop in imports, so net exports will make a positive con-
tribution to GDP. The decrease in activity will also have an 
impact on employment, which will be 0.35 % lower than 
in the baseline scenario.
According to this study, the negative impact on the 
Belgian economy may be mostly offset if authorities use 
their extra receipts to reduce employers’ social secu-
rity contributions. This would spread the charges more 
evenly among the production factors of labour, capital 
and energy. Furthermore, employment would benefit 
from the lower labour charges  : according to this study, 
it would even be higher than in the baseline scenario. As 
a result, the negative impact on private consumption will 
be almost cancelled out. Under this scenario as well, busi-
ness investment would remain lower than in the baseline 
scenario, but the difference would be reduced by half. 
The total negative impact on GDP would be lowered to 
0.07 % in 2020.
According to a recent study by the EC, support for inno-
vation may also be a stimulant that can offset the costs 
generated by the fight against climate change. Conte et 
al. (2010) analyse the impact of this fight for the entire 
EU. They look at five scenarios, which vary in the extent 
to which authorities redirect their additional receipts. The 
least favourable result in terms of GDP and employment 
is when authorities decide to use their additional receipts 
to reduce a flat-rate tax. If authorities lower the tax on 
earned income, employment in the EU in 2020 would be 
higher than in the baseline scenario, even though GDP 
would still be a bit lower. The latter is no longer the case 
in the other scenarios, in which 10-20  % of additional 
public receipts are used to subsidise innovative projects 
(environmentally friendly or not) and the remaining ad-
ditional receipts are used to lower the tax burden on 
labour. In these scenarios, employment would be less 
strongly stimulated than in the second scenario, but in 
2020 it would still be 0.2  % higher than in the baseline 
scenario, and GDP would also be slightly higher than in 
the baseline scenario.
Even though the results of such model-based simulations 
depend heavily on the underlying working assumptions, 
these studies clearly show that the fight against climate 
change will not necessarily cause a contraction in eco-
nomic activity. At the same time, it appears that not all 
sectors of activity or companies will be affected to the 
same extent. For example, the simulations cited above 
indicate slower activity principally in the energy sector 
(at least in the segment using fossil fuels) and transport 
sector (except rail transport). Conversely, we see strong 
growth in the sectors that meet the needs of a more en-
vironmentally friendly economy. Another task for authori-
ties is to prepare for and guide, as much as possible, the 
shifts arising in the economic structure. In this respect, we 
principally have in mind making sure that job-seekers have 
the qualifications to meet the (new) needs of companies.
3.2  Decrease in energy intensity
Over the past 15 years, the energy intensity of the Belgian 
economy has definitely trended downwards, but it re-
mains particularly high. In 2009, overall energy intensity 
– defined here as the ratio of gross energy consumption 
to GDP in volume terms – was 206 TOE per million euro 
in Belgium, whereas it was between 150 and 175 TOE 
(1)  The tonne of oil equivalent (TOE) is a unit of account for the amount of energy 
that a primary energy source represents and is more or less equal to the net 
calorific content of a tonne of crude oil. The units of primary energy sources 
other than oil are converted into tonne of oil equivalents using conversion 
coefficients.
Chart 7  overall enerGy intensity  (1)
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(1)  Calculated as the ratio between gross energy consumption and GDP in volume 
terms.70
per million euro in the principal neighbouring countries 
and the EU  (1). A country’s overall energy intensity is influ-
enced by numerous factors, such as economic structure, 
the average age of the building stock and capital stock, 
weather conditions, population density, standard of living 
and transport infrastructures. It is calculated using gross 
energy consumption and is thus influenced by final energy 
production methods due to differences in performance  (1). 
When comparing energy intensity across countries, it is 
thus important to remember that these differences are 
not only a function of efficiency.
3.2.1  Energy intensity in industry
The impact of the economic structure can be partially 
eliminated by analysing energy intensity at the level of 
the major economic sectors. Energy intensity in this case 
is defined as the ratio between final energy consump-
tion and the value added of each economic sector. This 
measure indicates that in recent years, Belgian industry 
has already made considerable headway. Between 2001 
and 2009, its energy intensity fell by a total of 26.8  %. 
Much of this downward trend is the result of voluntary 
agreements that many industrial companies signed with 
regional authorities to increase their energy efficiency. 
These companies have made a commitment to be among 
the global elite in terms of energy efficiency by 2012. In 
exchange, the authorities have pledged not to impose 
additional obligations in terms of energy savings or CO2 
reduction. Furthermore, the three Regions have put their 
full weight behind support for cogeneration technol-
ogy, which involves producing both electrical energy and 
thermal energy using the same primary energy source. 
Similarly, the creation of an authorisation policy based 
on the “best available techniques” has helped increase 
energy efficiency in industry.
Even though this process has helped close the gap vis-à-
vis the three principal neighbouring countries, Belgium 
still lags behind considerably, notably due to differences 
in industrial specialisation. For example, in 2008 the 
most energy-intensive industries – iron and steel works, 
metallurgy and non-ferrous metalworking, non-metallic 
minerals and chemicals and petrochemicals – represented 
37  % of the value-added of Belgian industry, compared 
with just 27  % in Germany and France. Furthermore, 
these industrial sectors also exhibit large differences that 
influence installations’ energy consumption. For example, 
the Belgian steel sector specialises in oxygen steel-making, 
(1)  Gross energy consumption includes the primary energy sources used (principally 
solid fuels, oil, natural gas and nuclear power). Final energy consumption 
is obtained after the primary energy sources have been transformed into 
usable forms of energy (principally refined oil products and electricity). Energy 
transformation and transport generate losses, primarily linked to the efficiency of 
the electric power plant.
which is produced using iron ore, whereas many other 
countries have more electric steel-making, which uses 
scrap metal. Given that the two production processes and 
types of steel are totally different, their energy consump-
tion is not comparable. Even though the industry could 
still opt for technologies that use energy more efficiently, 
the principal contribution will probably not come from 
this sector, at least in the current state of the technology.
3.2.2  Residential energy consumption
One of the areas in which energy efficiency could still 
improve considerably is energy consumption by Belgian 
individuals for domestic purposes (heating, lighting and 
electrical appliances). Over the period from 1999 to 2005, 
this consumption was significantly higher than those of 
the three principal neighbouring countries and the EU. 
In 2006 and 2007, energy consumption fell sharply, al-
though without closing the gap completely.
This relatively high energy consumption is partly attribut-
able to the fact that existing housing in Belgium is fairly 
old and tends not to be renovated extensively until the 
arrival of a new owner. This is why many old residences 
have only single-glazing windows and inadequate roof 
insulation. Moreover, Belgium’s housing stock includes 
a relatively large number of single-family homes and 
a relatively small number of apartments, which gener-
ally results in higher energy consumption for heating. 
Similarly, the share of social rental housing in the total 
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housing stock in Belgium, and in Germany, is consider-
ably lower than in France or the Netherlands, where pub-
lic authorities can increase the energy efficiency of those 
residential buildings. By contrast, the owners of housing 
that is rented out privately are less inclined to invest in 
energy efficiency because it is the tenant who pays the 
energy bills. Lastly, the consumer price of heating oil and 
natural gas is lower in Belgium than in the three principal 
neighbouring countries because excise duties are much 
lower  (1). As a result, the price signal is not strong enough 
to encourage Belgian households to practice rational 
residential energy consumption. Given that in Belgium, 
circumstances are unfavourable to sparing energy con-
sumption for domestic purposes, all interested parties 
(individuals, authorities and companies) must redouble 
their efforts to increase the energy efficiency of housing 
(and buildings in general).
Directive 2002  /  91/  EC on the energy performance of 
buildings notably sets out the requirements in terms of 
energy efficiency for new construction and renovation 
projects, for both residential buildings and non-residential 
buildings such as offices and commercial space. In this 
context, Belgian regulations on energy performance im-
pose a higher limit for the E value of new construction, 
a measure of a building’s energy consumption defined 
as the ratio between the theoretical energy consump-
tion of the building and a benchmark value  (2). The en-
ergy consumption calculation is based on several building 
characteristics, such as compactness, choice of energy 
source, windows and thermal insulation. These standards 
are increasingly strict. As at 1 September 2011, the limit 
was set at E80 in the Flanders Region and Wallonia. In the 
Brussels-Capital Region, it was set at E70 for housing and 
E75 for offices.
Given the weak percentage of renovated buildings, it is 
nevertheless evident that the existing housing stock can 
do the most to improve energy performances. A first 
stage will involve stimulating energy consulting activities 
by certifying energy experts who will then be in a position 
to perform inspections to measure the energy perfor-
mance of buildings and identify areas where improvement 
is possible. Introducing an energy performance certificate 
for existing buildings – giving potential buyers and rent-
ers information regarding a home’s energy efficiency – is 
another step in this direction. The introduction of energy 
labelling for home appliances is also raising consumer 
awareness of the environment.
The incentives cited above will make consumers more 
conscious of the potential economies. However, financial 
incentives are also necessary. Such incentives include, on 
the one hand, measures to increase the cost of products 
whose consumption is undesirable, and, on the other 
hand, measures to reduce the cost of products that limit 
energy consumption. For example, authorities may in-
crease excise duties on heating oil, natural gas and elec-
tricity, raising consumer prices of these energy sources 
and encouraging households to limit their consumption. 
Relatively low excise duties are principally attributable to 
the fact that spending on energy represents a fairly sig-
nificant portion of low-income households’ budgets, and 
higher excise duties are thus heavily regressive. To alleviate 
this impact, authorities can devise offsetting measures to 
raise the incomes of the less fortunate without reducing 
the dissuasive effect of higher energy costs.
Furthermore, there are currently numerous incentives and 
tax deductions for renovation work to improve a home’s 
insulation or for individuals buying energy-saving appli-
ances. For many households and companies, it is not 
easy to know which incentives they qualify for or who 
to apply to in that context. Thus, it would be helpful to 
simplify the range of incentives and conditions for receiv-
ing them. In addition, authorities must be sufficiently 
selective in handing out incentives. For example, when 
choosing which products to support, they need to take 
into consideration the cost-effectiveness of the measure. 
Furthermore, the individuals and companies who qualify 
for the incentive must be more carefully selected. For 
example,   inadequately insulated buildings should be dis-
qualified from the tax deduction for installing solar panels. 
Another possibility consists in planning specific financing 
options for low-income households (low-interest bank 
loans, assistance from an outside investor, etc.).
Generating substantial energy savings over the medium 
term will require greater efforts in innovation. Currently, 
several Belgian companies already specialise in developing 
and selling innovative materials that improve the energy 
efficiency of buildings. For example, the FEB (2010) no-
tably mentions as specialty areas the production of poly-
urethane insulation materials and applications limiting en-
ergy loss or excessive heating due to plate-glass windows. 
In addition, energy-efficient appliances are needed. In this 
respect as well, progress have been considerable, notably 
with the development of heat pumps, thermal solar water 
heaters, condensing boilers and micro-cogeneration. It 
is imperative that the workers installing this equipment 
receive enough continuing training for them to ensure 
that the new appliances operate properly and as effi-
ciently as possible. It is also important to improve profes-
sional training in the energy-efficiency renovation sector 
(1)  For more information, see Baugnet and Dury (2010).
(2)  This benchmark value is calculated using the building’s surface area of heat 
loss (interior and exterior separation constructions that result in a loss of heat), 
protected volume (rooms actually lived in and heated) and ventilation flow rate (a 
fixed function of the protected volume).72
and to adapt to new materials and new technologies. 
Applications in the ICT field can also encourage significant 
energy savings  ; these include sensors that automatically 
trigger switches or time switches that operate electrical 
appliances and heating systems.
3.2.3  Energy consumption for road transport
Alongside residential energy consumption, road trans-
port represents a significant component of final energy 
consumption. According to a McKinsey study (2009), 
consumption of fuel per passenger-kilometre in 1990 
was significantly higher in Belgium than in France, the 
Netherlands and the EU-25. Germany had an even worse 
score in this respect. However, Germany has significantly 
reduced its consumption of fuel, and by 2005 was well 
ahead of Belgium. Given that the Belgian fleet of vehi-
cles is relatively efficient from an energy standpoint, in 
part because of the significant share of diesel engines, 
Belgium’s poor standing is notably due to the fact that 
the number of passengers per vehicle is lower than in 
other countries, and to the fact that trips generally cover 
short distances in urban areas, which involves a relatively 
high use of fuel. Furthermore, consumer diesel and petrol 
prices, like heating oil and natural gas, are relatively low 
in Belgium because lower excise duties are levied on these 
products. So for transport as well, the price signal is too 
weak to encourage individuals and companies to adopt 
more rational energy consumption habits.
Limiting goods and passenger transport is thus a key 
concern. There are several examples of measures that can 
limit the transport of persons  : increased development of 
public transport (in terms of supply, punctuality and price), 
expanded infrastructure for bicycles and encouragement 
of carpooling and teleworking. As for merchandise, pro-
moting inland waterway and rail transport appear to be 
the principal tools. In this respect, much attention is being 
devoted to multimodal goods transport, which favours 
rail, maritime, river and canal transport, with only initial 
and terminal shipments taking place over roads. In addi-
tion, more efficient or more intelligent road transport may 
limit the number of empty or half-empty trucks on the 
road and reduce trips during rush hours.
If there are acceptable alternatives, an increase in excise 
duties on diesel and petrol can lead individuals and com-
panies to limit their consumption, encouraging them to 
choose transport options that pollute less. Given that the 
emissions released by road transport are heavily influ-
enced by the frequency of traffic jams, it is also possible 
to imagine a tax per kilometre driven that would vary de-
pending on the road followed and the time of the trip to 
discourage driving during rush hours. It is also important 
for the fleet of vehicles to be more environmentally 
friendly and reduce its emissions. For example, authorities 
are giving tax breaks to encourage buyers to purchase 
greener (and more expensive) vehicles. Today, the focus 
is on technical improvements to the fleet of conventional 
vehicles  : equipping them with particulate filters or start-
stop systems. Eventually, the biggest energy savings will 
come from wider use of electric or hybrid vehicles. In 
this area as well, certain Belgian companies have already 
gained considerable knowledge. Before such vehicles 
become widespread, it will be necessary to install needed 
infrastructure, notably for recharging electric batteries.
3.3  Investment in renewable energy
Given that the energy intensity of economic activities 
cannot be reduced indefinitely, the share of renewable 
energies in total consumption must also be increased. 
With respect to renewable energy sources, the EU has set 
itself the target of reaching a proportion of 20 % of gross 
final energy consumption by 2020. Belgium must attain a 
proportion of 13  %, one of the weakest national targets 
in the EU. This target notably takes into account Belgium’s 
high population density, limited number of sunlight hours, 
the relatively flat slope of its rivers and its limited coastline 
length, all of which mean that the country has fewer 
possibilities to create facilities that produce solar, wind, 
hydraulic or tidal power.
Even so, this target is ambitious for Belgium. In 2005, the 
share of renewables in its gross final energy consump-
tion was only 2.2  %. This proportion climbed to 3.3  % in 
2008. The pace of growth is thus much too slow for the 
country to reach the 13  % target by 2020. According to 
the Federal Planning Bureau, with current policies we will 
reach a proportion of only 7.5  % in 2016, which is less 
than the 8.6  % set out in the national renewable energy 
action plan that was submitted to the EC. As a result, 
considerable additional efforts will be needed to reach 
the ultimate goal. The delay may be partially erased by 
further reducing final energy consumption or by taking 
advantage of the option to promote efforts abroad.
The available figures on green electricity as a share of 
overall electricity consumption show that the produc-
tion of renewable energy in Belgium has been growing 
only recently. In 1990, only 0.8  % of overall electric-
ity consumption was produced from renewable energy 
sources, whereas the EU average was 11.6  %. At over 
50 %, Austria and Sweden are the leaders in this respect. 
Starting in 1999, however, the share of renewable energy 
in Belgium began to increase due to the use of biomass, 
and reached 6.1  % in 2009. Even so, the lag relative to 73
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the EU average remains considerable, given that the share 
of electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
was 18.2  % of overall electricity consumption at that 
point. Both in Belgium and in the EU, the rise is chiefly 
attributable to the success of biomass (wood, municipal 
waste and biogas) and wind power ; the share of geother-
mal and solar power remains very low.
In light of Belgian particularities, the greatest potential 
for growth lies with biomass and wind power. Each of 
these options, however, comes with a caveat. The power 
plants that produce thermal or electrical energy using 
biomass can pose an ethical problem from a sustainability 
standpoint. Increased use of these plants creates grow-
ing tension between agricultural land used to feed the 
population and land used for energy purposes. The same 
problem arises with the production of biofuels. In both 
cases, massive production of biomass is dangerous for 
the local environment. Furthermore, significant demand 
for certain types of biomass can threaten the food supply 
for a portion of the world population, either indirectly 
via an increase in food prices, or directly via inadequate 
food production. These problems result principally from 
the first generation of biomass (wood, sugar cane, corn, 
palm oil, rapeseed oil), and are less of an issue with the 
second generation (biodiesel, refined alcohol, materials 
produced from biomass as part of a chemical process, 
used frying oil, animal fats). Work is currently being done 
Chart 9  share of Green electricity































Source  : EC.
on a third generation of biomass, produced using specially 
prepared organisms such as algae which can contain more 
than 30 % oil. Many experts believe that algae are a good 
way to satisfy world demand for biomass and energy. 
However, years of research are still needed before they 
can be cultivated intensively, profitably and sustainably. 
The algae used as a source of biofuel are unlikely to arrive 
on the market before 2020. Another problem linked to 
the spread of small-scale biomass processing facilities lies 
in their emissions of fine particulates and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), which need to be tightly controlled.
As for wind power, Belgium has principally invested in 
offshore wind turbines over the past few years. At present, 
two offshore wind farms are already partially operational. 
The farm located on the Bligh Bank generates 165 MW 
of power, which will double in the years ahead to reach 
330 MW. The Thornton Bank farm currently produces only 
30 MW, but will be expanded to 325 MW. When both 
wind farms are entirely operational, they will represent 
estimated annual electricity production of around 2 TWh, 
which is enough to supply 650 000 households with green 
electricity. Furthermore, authorities have already granted a 
concession for a wind farm on the Bank With No Name in 
the North Sea. Many Belgian companies are participating 
in these projects. Their highly specific expertise has enabled 
them to earn worldwide recognition. The FEB (2010) nota-
bly cites the following specialties  : dredging and maritime 
construction, engineering and wind turbine components.
In this respect as well, a comprehensive vision is indispen-
sable because there is already a capacity problem now. The 
electricity generated by offshore wind farms must travel 
via the Elia high-voltage grid, which is already expected 
to operate at full capacity until its planned expansion 
in 2014. Due to the high-voltage grid’s limited capacity, 
other renewable energy projects in the country’s interior 
will go nowhere, even though they complement offshore 
projects  : they could supply the electric grid when there is 
not enough wind. The development of renewable sources 
of energy thus requires increased investment in a suitable 
electricity distribution grid able to handle the massive 
flows that could arise due to the fluctuating nature of 
renewable energy. The problem resulting from the inter-
mittent nature of wind power can notably be resolved 
by linking the offshore wind farms amongst themselves. 
As a result, periods of no wind and peak demand could 
be handled better and the average performance of the 
farms improved. In December 2009, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
the UK and Sweden signed a cooperation agreement to 
develop such an offshore grid in the North Sea and the 
Irish Sea. Furthermore, it will be important to adapt Belgian 
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capture the electricity generated in a decentralised manner 
by wind and solar facilities, and what could be supplied by 
electric vehicles. It is thus imperative to further research 
the applications of smart grids in order to manage unsta-
ble supply and consumption of electricity. There are other 
problems  : offshore wind energy projects often run into 
financing difficulties due to the size and risk profile of such 
investment. In addition, certain initiatives have trouble with 
environmental regulations  : certain projects, for example, 
must be built further offshore, which makes them more 
complex, most costly, and thus less appealing.
3.4  Carbon capture and storage
For certain (industrial) companies, it is very difficult, and in 
some cases unprofitable, to reduce CO2 emissions by us-
ing other energy sources or a production process that pol-
lutes less. Another possibility for these companies is car-
bon capture and storage. This solution will become more 
appealing the more ambitious emissions reduction targets 
become. Research is currently being done into local-level 
carbon extraction, which is essential for Belgian steel- and 
cement-makers. However, the principal problem is carbon 
storage. In this field, as well, Belgium is not well posi-
tioned. The Campine is the only region where storage is 
possible, but the suitable land is already being used for 
seasonal natural gas storage. As an alternative, some have 
suggested certain mine shafts in Wallonia, but several 
additional geological studies would be necessary. Thus, it 
will be important to invest in a pipeline to transport CO2 
for offshore storage under the North Sea or transport it by 
boat to other locations. For example, there is a project in 
Norway to extract carbon from the Sleipner field’s natural 
gas before storing it in a subsea aquifer layer.
Carbon extraction and capture techniques on a local 
scale are particularly energy-intensive. Existing technolo-
gies would result in a performance loss of around 10  %. 
Similarly, investment in the necessary infrastructure will be 
extremely large. Lastly, it is important not to lose sight of 
the legal aspects. However, this technique may also hold 
promise for the fight against climate change, because it 
provides a way to continue using coal, which is vitally 
important for fast-growing emerging countries such as 
China. At the same time, this technique must not be an 
impediment to initiatives aimed at reducing energy inten-
sity and increasing the use of renewable energy sources.
Conclusion
The fight against climate change is a major challenge for 
the world. With respect to Belgium, the ability to reduce 
its emissions is somewhat limited by its economic struc-
ture, given its energy-intensive industries and significant 
logistical role. As for renewable energy production, its 
options are also more limited than other countries’, given 
Belgium’s geographic and climate characteristics.
The situation calls for a collective effort to meet the emis-
sions reduction target. Private households will have to re-
alise that current consumption habits are not sustainable. 
In concrete terms, the areas where the most progress is 
possible are energy efficiency for housing and private 
transportation. Individuals need to understand that if 
everyone helps, even a modest individual contribution 
can make a big difference. When making consumption 
and investment decisions, individuals will have to give 
more weight to environmental considerations, which as-
sumes that there are sufficient environmentally friendly 
alternatives and that energy ratings and ecolabels are 
sufficiently clear. 
Either spontaneously or in response to measures taken 
by public authorities, many companies have already done 
much to improve their energy efficiency. These efforts 
need to be continued and stepped up. Furthermore, com-
panies have a crucial role to play in terms of innovation. 
They need not only to invest in scientific research, but 
also to do a better job of employing the resulting tech-
nological advances. Climate change is a global concern. 
There is thus a very large market for the new technolo-
gies needed to deal with it. The global dimension of the 
problem, however, also means that competition from 
foreign companies is particularly fierce. Thus, it is in the 
interests of Belgian companies to gain a foothold in the 
immense global market for eco-applications as soon as 
possible to maximise the profit to be had from a first-
mover advantage.
The contribution of authorities, lastly, involves encourag-
ing and supporting indispensable behavioural changes in 
the private sector. Companies and individuals need incen-
tives to take the steps that will reduce energy consump-
tion, and these come in a variety of forms  : information 
and awareness campaigns, financial incentives and regu-
lations. Furthermore, it will help to offer more alternatives 
to current pollution-causing activities. In this respect, 
authorities can do their part by supporting innovation and 
providing needed infrastructure (for example, with respect 
to public transport and renewable energy). In addition (lo-
cal) authorities can provide an example of rational energy 
consumption, and sustainable energy production and 
mobility. Lastly, they must make sure to invest adequately 
in education and training so that new technologies can be 
used, and guide the structural changes in the economy as 
best they can.75
The economic impacT of The fighT  
againsT climaTe change
The fight against climate change will clearly involve 
significant costs for the world economy. However, invest-
ment in developing low-emissions products and produc-
tion process offers prospects in terms of innovation, 
economic activity, sustainable growth and employment. 
Energy efficiency will truly be a decisive factor for the 
competitiveness of the European and Belgian economies. 
In addition, it will be to our companies’ advantage to 
conquer the global eco-innovation market as quickly as 
possible. In certain areas – such as dredging, wind pow-
er, engineering, building materials and basic materials for 
hybrid and electric vehicles – several Belgian companies 
have already acquired significant expertise and are now 
the principal suppliers in their niche. To hold on to and 
strengthen this position, companies, along with research 
centres and federal and regional authorities, must ab-
solutely place greater importance on fundamental re-
search. At present, this is already the case with biomass, 
biofuels, nuclear energy and waste treatment. Moreover, 
it will be necessary to strengthen collaboration among all 
parties concerned in order to strive for excellence with a 
common vision.  76
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